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Abstract 
 
Brazilian development cooperation is increasingly in the spotlight. Africa is a major destination and 
agriculture tops the list of priority fields on intervention, with Embrapa leading cooperation projects. 
But patterns of cooperation in Africa are changing as other public, private and civil society actors 
enter the realm of cooperation and bring along contrasting narratives and experiences of agricultural 
development. This article maps the evolving nature of Brazilian development cooperation in 
agriculture and discusses emerging features of the Brazil-Africa encounter, considering knowledge 
framings, policy narratives, imaginaries and the motivations driving a diversity of technical and 
political actors. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Brazilian development cooperation is increasingly in the spotlight. Its portfolio is relatively small 
compared to other ‘rising powers’– 2010 estimates of Brazilian cooperation vary between US$0.4 and 
1.2 billion,
1
 which puts it below Chinese cooperation estimated at around US$1.4 billion in 2009 
(Brautigam 2009: 168). Yet, Brazil is a source of world-leading expertise across a range of areas of 
great relevance to developing countries’ development processes – most notably agricultural research, 
health and social protection – and increasingly a reference for many African countries, especially 
those with historical and cultural affinities with this South American giant. The Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) are internationally 
renowned institutions for research on tropical agriculture and health, respectively. Bolsa Família is 
the world’s largest conditional cash transfer programme and has played a central role in moving 
millions of Brazilians out of extreme poverty (Vaitsman and Paes de Sousa 2007). 
 
Foreign policy has been a major driver of Brazilian cooperation and former President Lula da Silva 
was the engine behind the dynamism noticeable during recent years. His policy expanded the focus of 
cooperation beyond its traditional focus on Latin America and on Lusophone African countries, in 
what has been interpreted as a strategy of autonomy (via-à-vis US hegemony) through diversification 
of diplomatic and economic relations (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). Africa had a prominent position 
in Lula’s ‘presidential diplomacy’, justified by reference to a frequently-articulated sense of moral 
duty as well as to the continent’s commercial potential and geo-political significance as a southern 
ally (Matos 2011).
2
 Geopolitical alliances are particularly relevant in the realm of the UN, with the 
significant increase of diplomatic missions to Africa under Lula being viewed as a key part of a 
strategy to gather support for Brazil’s bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat (Malamud 2011). 
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The trend over the first couple of years of the administration of President Dilma Rousseff, who 
succeeded Lula in 2011, has been one of apparent continuity and emphasis on fulfilment of previous 
commitments. However, new nuances are being added to the approach. Reflecting the new President’s 
decision to emphasise meeting Brazil’s domestic development challenges ahead of assuming new 
global responsibilities, this approach is increasingly ‘focusing on the search for new markets for 
national investment and exports, particularly for higher added value products, and the mobilization of 
international capacities aiming at strengthening innovation in Brazil’ (Costa Leite 2013: 7).  
 
Within the federal government, budget cuts have forced a pause in the previously breakneck pace of 
expansion of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC),
3
 and there has been a marked reduction in the 
intensity of Presidential forays into what became known under the Lula government as ‘solidarity 
diplomacy’. This has resulted in a slowdown in the rate at which key agencies like Embrapa receive 
new demands triggered by Presidential visits or other diplomatic offensives (such as the effort to 
secure the post of FAO Director-General for Lula’s former advisor José Graziano da Silva).  
 
This article is based on interviews in Brazil as well as the discussions at an international seminar in 
Brasília, gathering together leading policy-makers, academics and practitioners.
4
 After this 
introduction, the article provides an overview of Brazilian development cooperation and its Africa and 
agricultural foci. The agricultural cooperation framework is analysed against the backdrop of Brazil’s 
domestic agricultural governance dynamics. Emerging features of the Brazil-Africa encounter are 
discussed and its fluid and contested contours are highlighted. 
 
2 Brazilian development cooperation 
 
Brazil states that its development cooperation is guided by principles of joint diplomacy based on 
solidarity, no interference in domestic issues of partner countries, demand-driven action, 
acknowledgement of local experience, no imposition of conditions, and no association with 
commercial interests (ABC 2011: 3). These principles are claimed to distinguish Brazilian 
cooperation from traditional forms of cooperation, particularly by reflecting a horizontal relationship 
between southern countries. Brazil rejects being labelled as a ‘donor’, a term it associates with the 
perceived vertical nature of North-South cooperation. Instead, it prefers to portray its cooperation as a 
mutually beneficial relationship between partners. The claimed benefits are not only economic or 
diplomatic, as Brazil’s technical and scientific cooperation initiatives have long deployed a discourse 
of ‘mutual learning’.5  
 
As a provider of development knowledge, Brazil claims the advantage of having expertise and 
technologies that fit the needs of developing countries, due to greater proximity (vis-à-vis Northern 
donors) in terms of economic and institutional development, culture and language (in the case of some 
African countries) and agro-climatic conditions, which are particularly relevant for cooperation in 
tropical agriculture. As the former director of ABC, Minister Marco Farani, put it:  
 
Because of similarities in social and economic realities and challenges to be faced in many 
areas, partner countries can absorb knowledge resulting from exchanging experiences with 
Brazil, which are more easily adapted and applied to real cases if compared to traditional 
solutions offered by traditional partners. (...) Affinities of historical, ethnical, cultural, 
linguistic and economic nature – as well as shared heritage and aspirations – favour the 
expansion and realization of south-south cooperation and contribute to its success. (ABC 
2010a: 97) 
 
Brazil also emphasises that it can offer its own tested solutions to development problems, rather than 
ideas of what may work (Cabral et al. 2013). Delivering appropriate ‘solutions’ to key development 
challenges that draw on Brazil’s own experience is seen both as a moral obligation in South-South 
relations and as a factor underpinning the country’s political legitimacy in Africa. In an interview 
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given shortly after Lula took office, Presidential advisor Marco Aurélio Garcia, one of the most 
influential foreign policy thinkers in Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT), stressed that ‘Brazil’s political 
weight in global politics can come from its ethical and moral presence in Africa; through the sharing 
of solutions.’6  
 
Technical cooperation is the most visible modality of the country’s cooperation portfolio and the one 
most explicitly used as a tool of diplomatic affairs. Technical cooperation consists of the transfer and 
adaptation of expertise, skills and technology mainly through training courses, workshops, 
consultancies, exchange programmes, and, occasionally, the donation of equipment. Brazilian 
technical cooperation is notable for drawing mostly on civil servants with direct experience of 
implementing the programmes whose transfer is being attempted, rather than consultants or other 
specialists from outside government. This means that the full cost (including the opportunity cost of 
staff time lost to the Ministries and other agencies providing the specialists) is difficult to account for.  
Brazil also provides scholarships for foreigners to study in Brazil; it assists countries facing 
emergencies (Haiti is the largest beneficiary of Brazilian humanitarian assistance); it makes 
contributions to international and regional multilateral institutions working in development, such as 
several UN agencies or the Inter-American Development Bank; it grants debt relief to highly indebted 
poor countries and it is increasingly offering export credits on concessional terms to countries in Latin 
America and Africa (Cabral 2011).  
 
A 2010 survey estimates that in 2009 Brazil’s development cooperation programme totalled US$362 
million, approximately 0.02 per cent of GNI (IPEA and ABC 2010). This calculation excludes 
however modalities such debt relief, export credits and food aid. Additional ABC estimates indicate 
that export credits are the largest cooperation modality, representing 42 per cent of the overall 
portfolio during 2005-2009. These typically consist of loans on concessional terms provided to other 
countries to finance the acquisition of Brazilian good and services and hence promote Brazilian 
exports (Cabral 2011). If this and other modalities (debt relief and food aid) are added in, the 
proportion of technical cooperation is a mere 3 per cent (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Brazilian development cooperation by modality (including debt relief and export credits), 
2005-9 
 
Source ABC (2011: 13). 
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However, technical cooperation, a key instrument of Brazilian diplomacy, has been expanding rapidly 
over recent years (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 Brazilian technical cooperation, annual budget and new projects, 2003-9 
 
Source IPEA and ABC (2010) and correspondence with ABC. 
 
There has also been a notable rise of trilateral (or triangular) cooperation arrangements, whereby 
cooperation is provided by Brazil alongside another donor (typically a traditional donor) to a 
beneficiary country. Japan, Germany, the United States and several UN agencies are amongst the 
main partners (on the provider side) of Brazil in trilateral cooperation. For Brazil, this allows its 
cooperation activities in third countries to be scaled up, complementing its technical cooperation 
inputs with other financial resources. Also legal and bureaucratic obstacles that face Brazilian 
government agencies working overseas can be overcome; for example by allowing procurement to be 
handled by the international partner. At the same time, triangular cooperation also offers a route for 
maintaining strategic links with traditional donors at a time when Brazil is making the transition from 
aid recipient to provider (Cabral and Weinstock 2010). 
 
2.1 The institutional setting and coordination challenges 
 
There are a great number of institutions – governmental and non-governmental – directly involved in 
the implementation of technical cooperation projects, raising considerable coordination challenges. 
ABC is mandated with a coordination role, and its capacity has been greatly boosted over recent years 
– its budget increased threefold between 2008 and 2010.7 However, ABC occupies a relatively low-
grade position in the government hierarchy. As a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MRE), it is a ‘virtual’ agency, with no financial autonomy or significant political clout. It has 
therefore limited space to set the cooperation agenda, plan ahead or act strategically in deploying its 
financial and human resources. The direction of cooperation is largely determined by MRE and 
specialised institutions, such as Embrapa for cooperation in agriculture, often in response to promises 
made to African countries during periods of ‘Presidential diplomacy’ (see below). ABC’s 
coordination role takes shape at the implementation level, organising the protocol and logistics for 
missions of Brazilian experts to the field. 
 
Another factor constraining ABC’s coordination function is the obsolete legal framework for 
Brazilian cooperation which limits the ability to operate abroad. Embrapa and Fiocruz are probably 
the only Brazilian cooperation actors, with the exception of the foreign office, which have the 
legitimacy to establish a presence overseas, although in the case of Embrapa, the creation of an 
international branch – Embrapa International – recently attracted significant internal criticism, which 
contributed to the resignation of the head of the agency in October 2012.
8
 Yet, ad-hoc solutions have 
been developed by ABC to circumvent these bottlenecks. For example, it has relied on UN agencies, 
such as the United Nations Development Programme, to deploy resources abroad and it has recently 
appointed a Maputo-based representative with specific responsibility for coordinating Brazilian 
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agricultural cooperation in Mozambique, although there is insufficient institutional support for the 
new role (Chichava et al. 2013).  
 
Finally, ABC’s mandate is restricted to technical cooperation, which represents only a fraction of 
Brazil’s development cooperation activities abroad. Responsibilities for other modalities of 
cooperation, such as debt relief, concessional lending and emergency relief, spread across several 
institutions including MRE, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Commerce, the International Trade Chamber (CAMEX) and the External Credit Assessment 
Committee (Cabral 2011).  
 
3 Brazil in Africa 
 
Africa featured prominently in Lula’s ‘presidential diplomacy’. The former president often spoke 
passionately about Brazil’s affinities with the continent and his country’s moral and fraternal duty to 
support Africa’s renaissance. During Lula’s administration (2003-2010), presidential visits to the 
continent reached record levels and the number of Brazilian embassies across Africa more than 
doubled (MRE 2011). Economic relations also intensified, with a considerable rise in trade and 
private investment in the mining, construction and oil sectors (CINDES 2012). 
 
During the first two years of her mandate, president Dilma Rousseff paid her first visit to the 
continent (touring Angola, Mozambique and South Africa – a selection that reflects Brazil’s list of 
primary investment destinations as much as the country’s cooperation agenda) and created Grupo 
África, an inter-ministerial group, with private sector representatives, focusing on Brazil’s relations 
with Africa. Dilma’s rhetoric seems less emotional and more pragmatic than Lula’s, with an explicit 
emphasis on commercial and investment opportunities for Brazilian enterprises, although also urging 
them to leave a ‘legacy’ to Africans through the transfer of technology, training and social 
programmes.
9
  
 
The role of MRE has been changing under Dilma’s administration. The major emphasis placed by 
Lula in the diversification of international partnerships and enhancement of Brazil’s projection as a 
global actor has given way to a more selective orientation that privileges the economic agenda, thus 
bringing diplomacy closer to Brazilian companies operating abroad (particularly those in the mining, 
construction, agriculture and oil sectors, in the case of Africa). A decline in the political rhetoric and 
foreign policy activism towards Africa seems noticeable: President Dilma’s trips to Africa have so far 
been more restrained that her predecessor, and arguably mainly motivated by an economic agenda.
10
  
 
Reflecting the country’s diplomatic and economic motivations, Brazilian cooperation spread steadily 
across the continent, with technical cooperation projects at either design or implementation stage in at 
least 38 countries (ABC 2011). In 2010, Africa accounted for the largest regional increase in 
spending, having absorbed 57 per cent of Brazil’s overall technical cooperation budget, though this 
share is expected to decline in the next two years. 
 
The five Portuguese-speaking African countries
11
 still remain Brazil’s main technical cooperation 
partners, with Mozambique being the single largest beneficiary (Figure 3). In 2010, these accounted 
for 74 per cent of resources spent in technical cooperation in Africa (Cabral and Weinstock 2010). 
Yet, Brazil’s portfolio of partners is being diversified, mirroring the spreading of the diplomatic 
network and deepening of economic relations across the continent.  
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Figure 3 Top ten beneficiaries of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa, 2011 
 
Source ABC (2011). 
 
Alongside technical cooperation, other modalities are being increasingly drawn on for South-South 
cooperation with Africa. Debt relief has either been granted or is in the process of being granted to 
several African countries, clearing the way for additional lending to be made available by the 
Brazilian banking system (Cabral 2011). Some of these loans are concessional and focused on 
development objectives, such as a new credit facility to support African farmers in buying agricultural 
machinery for productivity gains and food security. Others are primarily motivated by commercial 
objectives, such as most lending provided by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to countries 
like Angola, Nigeria and South Africa. BNDES is a key ally and resource for major Brazilian 
corporations such as Vale (mining) and Odebrecht (construction and agribusiness), which are active in 
many African countries (Barka 2011).  
 
3.1 A focus on agriculture 
 
Agriculture tops the list of Brazilian technical cooperation sectors. Between 2003 and 2010, it 
accounted for 26 per cent of the country’s technical cooperation portfolio in Africa (Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4 Brazilian technical cooperation by sector supported in Africa, 2003-10 
 
Source ABC (2011). 
 
There are more than 20 Brazilian institutions involved in technical cooperation in agriculture in 
Africa, covering a wide range of issues, and with very different conceptual and ideological 
perspectives (Cabral and Shankland 2013). This reflects the diverse stances of different Brazilian 
institutions, ranging from those committed to technical modernisation and agribusiness and those 
interested in ‘family farming’, agrarian reform and agroecology. This plurality inevitably brings with 
it contradictions and contests at the centre of the cooperation effort.   
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Embrapa, the research corporation, is by far the most prominent institution involved. But as 
Embrapa’s capacity to respond to burgeoning demand from developing countries is being stretched to 
the limit, it has looked for partnerships with or given way to other agricultural research institutions, 
including universities like the Federal University of Viçosa, as well as subnational agencies managed 
by Brazilian state governments (ABC 2010b). As the topics in the agriculture cooperation portfolio 
with Africa diversify, so do the range of Brazilian players involved. In particular, MDA’s presence in 
the portfolio is expanding, carrying with it the focus on ‘family farming’, food security and agrarian 
reform, sometimes contrasting starkly with other efforts.  
 
Despite the prominence of Lusophone countries in the agriculture cooperation portfolio, technical 
cooperation in agriculture has been expanding considerably across the continent. An event hosted by 
President Lula da Silva back in 2010 – Diálogo Brasil-África12 – played an important part in 
promoting Brazil as a source of cutting-edge expertise on tropical agriculture for Africa (ABC 2010a). 
In his opening speech, President Lula emphasised the crucial role played by Embrapa’s research and 
development in Brazilian agriculture, namely in transforming the supposedly barren Cerrado, the 
central Brazilian savannah belt, and noted opportunities for transferring this experience into Africa as 
‘the African savannah has the same productive characteristics as the Brazilian Cerrado’.13 He also 
singled out two particular agricultural programmes, which the Ministry of Agrarian Development 
(MDA) and other institutions have been implementing in Brazil: the More Food Programme and the 
Food Acquisition Programme.   
 
The More Food Africa Programme aims to increase agricultural productivity and food security in 
Africa by improving access to technology. This MDA-led programme adapts a similar programme 
implemented in Brazil, since 2008, as part of the National Programme for Strengthening Family 
Farming (PRONAF). It consists of a credit facility to support the acquisition of farm machinery and 
equipment supplied by Brazilian manufacturers, which have been intensively involved with the design 
of the programme, including in negotiations over pricing. It is directed at ‘family farming’ (or the 
rather different African equivalent), with lending complemented by specialised technical assistance. A 
total of US$640 million has been approved by CAMEX for implementation of this programme in 
Africa in 2011-12. Credit lines have already been negotiated with Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Senegal and Kenya. Lula noted that ‘[Brazil] has the capacity to create in Africa the same credit 
policies on offer for Brazilian farmers’ and added that he would like to extend the same credit line to 
countries ‘wanting to modernize their agriculture’.14 
 
With regards to the Food Acquisition Programme, Lula emphasised that the programme has both 
strengthened family farming and helped developing regional markets (by ensuring 30 per cent of food 
procured for school feeding programmes are sourced locally), and announced the intention to 
implement 10 similar pilot projects across Africa.
15
 A sum of US$2.4 million has already been 
committed to take the programme to five African countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger 
and Senegal. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) 
are partners of what has become a trilateral cooperation programme. 
 
3.2 Embrapa: The face of Brazilian cooperation in agriculture 
 
Embrapa is often seen as the face of Brazilian cooperation in agriculture. It is a research corporation 
that was established in 1973 to promote technological development in agriculture and particularly to 
support the development of the Cerrado, the vast tropical savannah of over 200 million hectares 
spreading across the central regions of Brazil, whose significant agricultural potential it helped to 
unlock (Martha Junior and Ferreira Filho 2012; Hosono and Hongo 2012).  
 
Embrapa has grown into a massive organisation, with a network of 47 specialised research and service 
provision units distributed throughout the country and specialised in products (maize and sorghum, 
soybean, etc.), ecological zones (Cerrado, semi-arid, etc.), and themes (environment, satellite 
monitoring, etc.) (Martha Junior and Ferreira Filho 2012). With an impressive research capacity 
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(8,200 employees including 2,600 researchers, 50 per cent of whom have a PhD), Embrapa is today a 
world reference in tropical agriculture research and technology. Having played a key role in the 
‘miracle of the cerrado’ (The Economist 2010b) it is set to take this experience into Africa.   
 
Embrapa dominates the portfolio of cooperation projects as the source of expertise for agriculture-
related issues, particularly in areas such as strengthening developing countries’ research capacity and 
adapting Brazilian technology to these countries’ agro-ecological conditions (ABC 2010b). It has its 
own international cooperation division, responsible for managing and coordinating technical 
cooperation initiatives. This unit has about 50 staff distributed across three sub-divisions: technical 
cooperation, ‘structural projects’ (see below) and scientific cooperation. The latter is not concerned 
with cooperation for international development, but rather scientific exchanges (mostly with European 
and US institutions) with the aim of strengthening Brazil’s cutting-edge scientific research. 
 
Embrapa draws on several of its specialised research and service provision units for development 
cooperation in particular topics. Units whose presence seems most recurrent in technical cooperation 
projects include: Embrapa Horticultures, Embrapa Cerrados, Embrapa Tropical Agro-industry, 
Embrapa Meat Livestock and Embrapa Dairy Livestock.
16
 But the range is increasing. In a single new 
project in one country – ProSavana in Mozambique - there are as many as 16 Embrapa units 
involved.
17
  
 
Training courses for researchers and practitioners from partner countries are also an important 
component of Embrapa’s contribution to development cooperation. One-off courses are giving way to 
a more structured and strategic training programme coordinated by the recently established Centre for 
Strategic Studies and Training on Tropical Agriculture (CECAT). This includes training not only on 
technical agriculture subjects – from no-till planting to post-harvest – but also on agricultural 
economics, sociology, policy and institutions. 
 
Embrapa’s footprint in Africa has expanded over recent years, with a vigorous push from President 
Lula, who was enthusiastic about the research corporation’s potential contribution to Africa’s 
development. In 2006, Embrapa opened an office in Accra, Ghana, with the aim of facilitating 
engagement with African institutions on technical cooperation matters, although the operation was 
downgraded in 2011 and now focuses solely on Ghana projects. Embrapa’s presence is now being 
strengthened elsewhere – particularly in Mozambique, where a growing portfolio of bilateral and 
trilateral cooperation initiatives includes the most ambitious of ‘structural projects’, centred on 
collaboration with Mozambique’s national agricultural research institution (Chichava et al. 2013).  
 
3.3 Brazil’s agricultural development policy: Contradiction or complementarity? 
 
Since the late 1990s, Brazil has two federal government ministries with responsibility for developing 
the country’s agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) describes 
itself as the ‘ministry for agribusiness’. It advocates domestically for the interests of large-scale 
commercial farmers, and externally for a favourable trade regime for Brazilian agricultural 
commodity exports. It oversees Embrapa and a number of other key government agencies, including 
CONAB, the agency responsible for managing the national food reserves. MAPA has been 
instrumental in the promotion of the concept of ‘agribusiness’ as a discursive frame for drawing 
together the interests of groups pursuing different capital-intensive forms of commercial agriculture, 
from ranching to rice-growing, in defence of a supportive policy framework for their activities  
(Sawyer 2009). It is supported in this by a powerful cross-party caucus within Congress, the bancada 
ruralista. One of its leading members, Senator Kátia Abreu, heads the National Confederation of 
Agriculture (CNA), and has herself been actively engaged in promoting the expansion of Brazilian 
agribusiness to Africa. 
 
MDA describes itself as the ‘ministry for family farming’. It oversees the land reform agency 
(Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária, INCRA), leads on the national ‘Citizenship 
Territories’ strategy for delivering integrated rural and social development in Brazil’s poorest regions, 
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and runs a number of programmes designed to ensure the provision of technical support and credit for 
‘family farmers’, under the umbrella of PRONAF. PRONAF was established back in the 1990s, 
before the creation of MDA, as the main policy framework for supporting family farming. The 
programme was initially geared towards small farms with intermediary or high levels of capital. But 
the mobilisation of rural social moments around the programme has gradually pushed it towards 
supporting the smallest and most disadvantaged farmers groups, including women farmers (Favareto 
2006). Today, the family farming policy domain is structured around different organisations 
representing distinct social groupings within the broad family farm category. Landless rural workers 
are represented by the Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST), which influences INCRA and 
agrarian reform policies. Poor farmers are represented by workers’ unions such as the National 
Federation of Workers in Family Farming (FETRAF) and, especially, the National Agricultural 
Workers’ Federation (CONTAG), that in turn influence parts of MDA. Finally, the wealthiest and 
relatively more capitalised family farmers are closer to organisations such as CNA, through which 
they channel their demands for cutting-edge technology and access to high value markets. 
 
The penetration of the two different ministries by distinct and often mutually antagonistic social and 
political forces has, in simplified terms, translated into a ‘two-headed’ polarised structure and within 
Brazil entrenched political divisions have prevented the emergence of a policy framework directed at 
supporting the very significant contingent of producers who bridge the worlds of ‘agribusiness’ and 
‘family farming’. The key questions arising are whether such a polarised structure is reflected in 
development cooperation projects and what implications this may have for beneficiary countries. 
 
Other government institutions with a strong presence are the Technical Assistance and Rural 
Extension Enterprises (EMATER), providers of agricultural extension services at the state level, and 
the National Rural Learning Service (SENAR), a parastatal linked to the CNA that is specialised in 
rural technical training. Some of these institutions have their own international cooperation units. 
 
Besides governmental institutions, some NGOs and social movement organisations are being brought 
into the Brazilian cooperation framework, and the General Secretariat of the Presidency has played an 
active role in engaging these actors in official cooperation arrangements. A project aiming to recover 
and preserve native seeds in Mozambique and South Africa, Implantação de Bancos Comunitários de 
Sementes Crioulas em Áreas de Agricultura Familiar, draws on the experience of two Brazilian social 
movement organisations in the field, the Women Farmers’ Movement and the Popular Peasant 
Movement, alongside the Brazilian Institute for Economic and Social Analysis (IBASE), a well-
respected social policy analysis and advocacy NGO. This initiative aims to connect Brazilian rural 
civil society and farmers’ organisations with their equivalents in Africa, building on links already 
established through networks such as Vía Campesina. The engagement of the General Secretariat of 
the Presidency reflects the extension into international development cooperation of a particular 
Brazilian dynamic of state ‘institutional hosting’ of social movements that intensified since the 
Workers’ Party (PT) arrived in national office in 2002. This form of support involves the creation of 
institutionalised spaces for dialogue with even the most radical of movements, such as MST, linked to 
the channelling of resources to movement leaders and allies and the incorporation into government 
policy of movement discourses and practices by sympathisers positioned inside the state (Cornwall et 
al. 2008).  
 
3.4 Policy incoherence or demand-driven flexibility? 
 
Despite all this activity and the multiple institutions involved, there is no explicitly formulated policy 
for Brazilian cooperation in agriculture. Beyond the general guiding principles, there is no official line 
on what the policy objectives and approach are for cooperation in agriculture – or indeed any other 
sector or theme. The common justification for this gap is the ‘demand-driven’ and ‘non-interference’ 
attributes of cooperation, which are claimed to require entering cooperation agreements without pre-
set agendas. The ‘no-policy’ policy could be interpreted, however, as the result of institutional 
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segmentation of cooperation in general and, for the agriculture sector in particular, the fragmented 
nature of Brazil’s agricultural governance. 
 
The fragmentation of the institutional map reflects to some extent the nature of Brazilian technical 
cooperation. Despite over 20 institutions being actively involved in agriculture cooperation, there is 
virtually no institutional direction or coordination on the content of interventions, as ABC’s role is 
essentially confined to operational coordination, and MRE is concerned with higher-level diplomatic 
issues. What emerges is a cooperation framework that lacks a unified or coherent policy direction and 
in practice is shaped by the agendas, experiences and indeed imaginaries of the various institutions 
and individuals, from Presidential visions to the practices of those delivering technical cooperation on 
the ground. The unstructured institutional basis for engagement allows for diversity to emerge, and 
change to occur, often in ad-hoc fashion.  
 
In recent years, changes in the nature of Brazilian cooperation have indeed been taking place, 
reflecting the increasing size of operations as well as accumulation of expertise. On the one hand, 
one-off small-scale technical cooperation projects are progressively giving way to larger projects, 
with a longer time horizon, focused on strengthening capacities of local institutions and with more 
explicit concern for impact and sustainability. Such projects are referred to as ‘structural projects’ 
(ABC 2011). Cotton 4 was the first of this kind. 
 
The nature of technical cooperation is also expanding beyond simpler forms of assistance (such as 
training, study visits and workshops) by gradually focusing on the adaptation of successful Brazilian 
policies to the African context. This was already happening in other sectors, an example being Bolsa 
Família. In agriculture, the 2010 Diálogo Brasil-África event marked the beginning of this shift and 
introduced the adaptation of Brazilian agricultural policies into the technical cooperation portfolio. 
Examples of this include More Food Africa and the Food Acquisition programmes. 
 
Furthermore, new modalities of cooperation are also being introduced alongside technical 
cooperation, as illustrated by More Food Africa, which combines conventional technical assistance in 
agriculture with a credit facility directed to African farmers. Such modality blending approach may be 
a reflection of the mixed motivations behind Brazilian cooperation, which appears to be increasingly 
showing signs of mingling solidarity-driven and business-driven agendas.   
 
Finally, triangular cooperation is adding scale and visibility to Brazilian technical cooperation 
projects. ProSavana, currently the largest project in the agriculture portfolio, is the product of a 
trilateral cooperation agreement between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique. The Food Acquisition 
Programme is another example of a trilateral partnership, between Brazil, FAO, WFP and five African 
countries. The United States is also a key partner in trilateral agricultural cooperation, particularly in 
Mozambique. 
 
4 Emerging features of the Brazil-Africa encounter 
 
What then are the emerging features of the Brazil-Africa encounter, as framed by these development 
cooperation efforts? What are the political drivers, what are the narratives and social imaginaries 
being deployed, and what are the impacts and consequences on the ground? Five themes emerge. 
 
4.1 The confluence of altruistic and self-interested motivations  
 
Development cooperation in Brazil is explicitly an instrument of foreign policy (Costa Vaz and Inoue 
2007) and, therefore, the expression of geopolitical strategies that are bound to include a range of self-
interested objectives (Lima and Hirst 2006). This is hardly different to any other country with an 
international development programme, although the degree to which countries are forthright about the 
link between charity and self-interest is somewhat variable. Brazil claims, however, that its 
cooperation approach is guided by the principle of ‘solidarity diplomacy’, which brings together 
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elements of altruism (supporting those in need) and reciprocity (forging mutually beneficial 
partnerships) in a horizontal relationship between southern peers. The combination of altruistic and 
self-interested drives in Brazilian cooperation mirrors competing perspectives within Brazil with 
regards to international relations and the balance between those perspectives is likely to be changing 
as Lula’s emphatic ‘solidarity diplomacy’ is giving way to Dilma’s more business oriented approach.  
 
The narrative of solidarity fits well with the roots and mandate of the lead party of the ruling coalition 
– the PT – whose foreign policy intellectuals were instrumental in giving initial impetus to Lula’s 
policy of reaching out to Africa. It also fits with objectives concerning geopolitics and the quest for 
support, particularly from non-OECD countries, for greater clout in global politics and the governance 
of international bodies in particular. The pragmatic impulse responds to the drive of a growing 
economy like Brazil to secure access to raw materials, markets and profitable deals for its burgeoning 
businesses. Africa, with its generous resource endowments and relative political openness to 
engagement by a rising power with no apparent colonial baggage, represents an increasingly attractive 
destination for Brazilian traders and investors. 
 
Such multiple motives are evident in agricultural cooperation where, on the one hand, there is an 
agenda focused on assisting countries that are seeking to achieve food sovereignty and to strengthen 
their smallholder agriculture (often promoted by PT-affiliated government officials with links to 
Brazilian social movements and their international networks, such as Vía Campesina) and, on the 
other hand, commercial interests are shaping the nature of assistance. More Food Africa is an example 
of confluence of both motivations. The programme aims to address productivity and food insecurity 
constraints, including in newly resettled agricultural land in Zimbabwe that has been marginalised by 
traditional donors (Mukwereza 2013). But the programme is also serving the interests of Brazilian 
industry, being seen as an ‘industrial policy’ designed to ensure a ‘steadily increasing demand’ for the 
Brazilian farm machinery sector (Patriota and Pierri 2013: 28). ProSavana is another example of 
convergence of interests in that alongside the technical cooperation component, focused on 
strengthening research and extension, the programme is also helping to steer private investment from 
Brazil (and Japan) into Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor via the recently launched Nacala Fund 
(Chichava et al. 2013).  
 
These contradictions bring tensions. Thus the discourse of ideological solidarity that animates the 
MDA’s More Food Africa programme may be challenged by the reality of directing tied aid and the 
need to ensure that loans are repaid. The narrative of purely technical engagement that Embrapa has 
sustained in ProSavana will become harder to maintain once large numbers of Brazilian investors start 
arriving in the Nacala Corridor. The outcome of contestations over which motivations should be given 
precedence will inevitably reflect the relative power and influence of the different groups – whether 
diplomats, activists or investors – who have aligned themselves with them. This, in turn, will reflect 
wider political economy dynamics within Brazil as this historically inward-looking country adjusts to 
the broadening and deepening of its global engagements. 
 
4.2 Narratives of agricultural development: Dichotomy or pluralism? 
 
Brazil’s cooperation policy for the sector is what emerges from the sum of the various initiatives, 
programmes and projects being carried out by a range of institutions and people, generally guided by 
a broadly defined code of conduct. As discussed, contrasting narratives on agriculture development 
emerge, reflecting competing visions of development. In particular, there is a tension between a model 
of agricultural development prioritising smallholder production systems and a model driven 
essentially by capital-intensive and large-scale commercial farming interests. Thus, the cooperation 
programme spearheaded by MDA is tightly associated with the former model, whereas most (though 
by no means all) of Embrapa’s cooperation activities tend to be associated with the latter.  
 
Such competing visions mirror Brazil’s complex agrarian political economy. Whether they are a sign 
of a ‘Gramscian struggle for hegemony’18 or of a ‘pluralistic model’19 is a matter of interpretation. 
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The former perspective seems to highlight dichotomy and inconsistencies between two conceptually 
and ideologically opposing models of development, reflected in agricultural policy at the national and 
international levels. The latter emphasises a pragmatic division of labour that has arguably allowed for 
the development of complementary policies supporting both family farming and agribusiness. It also 
emphasises the positive diversity of Brazil’s agricultural landscape, where ‘small, medium and large 
farmers work together in an environment conducive to innovation’.20 In the words of President Lula: 
‘here in Brazil the government has to finance both agribusiness and family agriculture and we are 
proud to do this because we understand the importance both sectors have in Brazilian economy.’21 
 
4.3 Knowledge exchange: First-hand experience and the limits of the technocratic 
approach 
 
One distinctive attribute of Brazilian technical cooperation is the direct deployment of expertise 
without intermediaries. Brazilian institutions (governmental or not) typically make use of their own 
staff to transfer into partner countries the knowledge and policies with which they have been 
experimenting within Brazil. Brazilian ‘development workers’ have first-hand experience with the 
issues on which development cooperation projects focus. For example, in an on-going food security 
research project in Mozambique, called ProAlimentos, researchers from specialist Embrapa centres in 
Brazil are working directly in the field with researchers from the Mozambican Agrarian Research 
Institute testing suitable horticulture varieties for the Maputo greenbelt (Chichava et al. 2013). 
Likewise, staff from the MDA are working directly with their counterparts in several African 
countries to adapt Brazil’s More Food programme to local conditions. Consultants are occasionally 
contracted, but most of the work is typically carried out directly by Brazilian technocrats. The 
advantages of such an approach are obvious, and in fact it is an aspect that recipients frequently praise 
about Brazilian cooperation (Cabral et al. 2013). But there are some caveats. 
 
While Brazilian ‘development workers’ are experts in their own trade, they are not typically (though 
there are exceptions) well acquainted with Africa and the challenges of development in African 
contexts. They tend to operate as groups of single-sector specialists, without the opportunities for 
developing a broader understanding of local realities that can come from involving different 
disciplinary perspectives. Embrapa researchers may have the skills to become world-class authorities 
on African plant genetics and soil structures, but establishing successful and sustainable research 
programmes will require not only good crop science but also a good grasp of the functioning of local 
institutions and the political dynamics of development.  
 
The idea that development can be achieved through technical fixes has a long history, punctuated by 
repeated failures in many fields, not least that of African agriculture. Brazilian imaginaries of 
agricultural development, shaped by experiences such as the transformation of the Cerrado, are 
dominated by an inflated optimism about the power of technological modernisation that sometimes 
borders on techno-utopianism (Shankland et al. 2012).  
 
4.4 Discourses of historical and cultural affinity 
 
Historical and cultural affinities are often claimed to provide a particularly favourable underpinning 
for cooperation between Brazil and African countries. The affinities discourse was particularly strong 
in Lula’s administration. For example, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, noted 
that: ‘Brazil and Africa are connected by inseparable historical, cultural and demographic bonds’ 
(ABC 2010a: 93). Recently, at a BNDES-sponsored event on investing in Africa, former President 
Lula put the Brazil-Africa relationship in the following terms: ‘We are natural partners, we are old 
friends, we will always be brothers. (...) Gone is the time when the Atlantic separated us. It brings us 
together into a single border. We are neighbours that bathe in the same waters’.22 
 
But despite historical bonds and the agroecological similarities, the much-claimed affinities between 
Brazil and Africa are largely rhetorical. On the one hand, differences between Brazil and most African 
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countries, whether economic, political or sociological, are not trivial. Brazil has almost a century of 
experience with channelling the proceeds from agricultural commodity export booms into industrial 
and service-sector development and fostering the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie, an experience 
denied to Africa by the continent’s much later decolonisation. African countries have also had fewer 
opportunities to innovate at scale, given its fragmentation into smaller polities than ‘continental’ 
Brazil.  
 
Brazil’s longstanding ties with some countries arise from a Portuguese colonial past in which Brazil 
and Africa were at opposite ends of the slave trade. Many intellectuals of the Brazilian Left draw 
analogies between resistance to the military dictatorship in Brazil from 1964-85 and the roughly 
contemporaneous anti-colonial struggles in Africa, and the MRE corps includes a strong contingent of 
diplomats whose worldview was forged during the golden age of anti-colonial solidarity (Dávila 
2011). Yet the struggles in Brazil and Africa were very different in nature, as were the political 
systems that arose from Brazilian democratisation and African decolonisation. 
 
On the other hand, gaps in knowledge about the other side of the partnership remain deep across the 
Atlantic. On the African side, the myth of Brazil’s successful agricultural transformation seems strong 
and a particular model of agricultural development fills the dominant imaginary of prosperity, with 
insufficient understanding of the social and environmental costs associated with that model (FAC 
2010). African elites attracted by the opportunities for profitable association with Brazilian 
agribusiness have few incentives to question this myth. In general, the main experience of Brazilian 
agricultural development that African policy-makers and practitioners have is the version presented to 
them during courses and study tours; the more critical perspectives developed by the growing 
numbers of African students at Brazilian universities have as yet found few opportunities to engage 
with the official narratives.
23
 
 
On the Brazilian side, the scope for developing a more nuanced understanding of African realities is 
constrained by several factors. One is how recent and limited the physical presence of Brazilian 
cooperation is. Furthermore, there is a limited pool of expertise on which to draw, given that Brazilian 
academic research and teaching on contemporary African politics and society is still limited. There is 
also limited influence of Brazilian afro-descendents, the social group with, arguably, the closest 
cultural kinship with the continent (or at least parts of it), in formal Brazilian institutions. The 
potential role of afro-descendents as brokers in the Brazil-Africa knowledge encounter remains poorly 
explored. Meanwhile, the Brazilian public’s perceptions of the continent continue to be shaped by 
representations in the media and the education system that mix idealised ‘Mama África’ narratives of 
Afro-Brazilian history with negative stereotypical representations of contemporary Africa (Oliva 
2009).  
 
4.5 The role of civil society: Reproducing Brazil’s state-society dynamics 
 
In the Brazilian context, civil society and social movements have played a major role in public policy-
making. Can the development cooperation model, currently confined to government-to-government 
relations, involve greater participation of Brazilian civil society?  
 
The General Secretariat of the Presidency has been actively engaging Brazilian social movements in 
government-led development cooperation, including particular projects and the creation of a civil 
society forum for the Community of Lusophone Countries (CPLP) to promote civil society dialogue.
24
 
Furthermore, Brazilian civil society is itself becoming more informed, organised and vocal around the 
subject of international development.
25
 
 
Within Brazil, the most influential civil society groups are those with historic links to social 
movements, and they have generally managed to maintain a critical distance in their policy 
engagements even as the process of ‘institutional hosting’ within structures such as the MDA brings 
them politically closer to government and as their dependence on state funding grows. However, there 
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is no guarantee that this critical distance will be maintained in the international arena, in the absence 
of the highly-mobilised Brazilian grassroots constituencies who play a key role in resisting the 
cooptation of civil society representatives by the state. 
 
Some Brazilian NGOs and social movement organisations are already engaging with African civil 
society groups. This is happening through exchanges sponsored by international NGOs and networks 
such as Vía Campesina, which has been particularly present in Mozambique supporting local 
concerns over the dangers of ProSavana reproducing in Mozambique the social and environmental 
costs of Brazil’s Cerrado transformation (Chichava et al. 2013). It is also happening through the 
official cooperation channels facilitated by the General Secretariat of the Presidency. These 
engagements are underpinned by a particular Brazilian understanding of the role of civil society, 
which combines a critical posture with a premise of symbolic equality and an assumption that the 
state is permeable to development policies and practices originating in civil society. How applicable 
such models are in the African context remains an open question.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The Brazil-Africa encounter, as being played out in agricultural development, is rapidly evolving, 
being framed by each of these themes. Each displays distinct tensions, reflecting different political 
dynamics, being played out in the domestic sphere in Brazil and within cooperation activities in 
Africa. For all the emphasis placed on the potential of ‘mutual benefit’ in the philosophy of South-
South cooperation, the reality beyond the rhetoric is more complex. Brazil has recently been taking a 
more self-interested approach. While Lula da Silva insisted that cooperation with Africa was driven 
by altruistic motivations and a sense of responsibility towards the continent, President Rousseff is 
revealing a more pragmatic attitude – and since leaving the presidency Lula himself has become 
increasingly associated with efforts to encourage Brazilian private investment in Africa.  
 
With the emphasis of Brazilian agricultural development cooperation in Africa currently placed so 
strongly on productivity and technological modernisation, with the direct deployment of Brazilian 
expertise, alternative framings from within Brazil’s own agrarian and social policy debates have been 
left behind. Will the coexistence of ‘family farming’ and ‘agribusiness’ models in Brazilian 
agricultural cooperation help to address the long-running debates on small-versus-large production 
systems in Africa in a holistic way – or will it, instead, help to replicate a particular dualistic agrarian 
structure and thereby accentuate inequalities of power and access in Africa? Brazilian actors 
associated with alternative framings, and particularly the focus on ‘family farming’ – from the MST 
to the agroecology movement – are beginning to mobilise, questioning dominant development 
cooperation models within Brazil, reaching out to build alliances with civil society groups in Africa.  
 
Ultimately, however, the outcomes of Brazil’s emergence as a major force in African agriculture will 
be shaped not only by the contestations among Brazilian actors over which agricultural development 
model to privilege, but above all by the ways in which African governments, farmers, entrepreneurs 
and civil society activists absorb and shape the application of the models on offer. It is these 
encounters – between knowledge framings, diverse technical and political actors and political interests 
– that will, in the end, determine the contours of the Brazil-Africa engagement. As this article has 
shown, this is currently evolving fast and is intensely contested.  
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